The Crisis in Darfur and Chad

Bill Quigley

05 Sep 2007

🖨️ Print Article

The Crisis in Darfur and Chad
by
Bill Bonnar

"Access to farmland and proximity to other countries are
key factors in the current crisis."

This article was first published by the Scottish Socialist Party's organ, Red Flag. DarfurSkeleton

The images on the television screen are now so familiar we become immune.
Unimaginable numbers of people suffering and dying in a part of the world we
know little about for reasons we know even less. What is it we feel? Sadness,
pity, a sense of anger, a sense of hopelessness? Yet when 4 year old Madeline
McCann is snatched from her parents in Portugal the sense of outrage and the
demand for action is overwhelming. The difference is that we can feel empathy
for Madeline's parents who are just like us and have an idea that our concerns
and actions will make a difference. It becomes personal.

It is difficult to do this for the mass of faceless people
now suffering along the Darfur/Chad border, so we make the right noises,
perhaps make a donation to the relevant charity and move on to the next news
item. Yet the people suffering are just like us; parents, children, brothers,
sisters, grandparents; people with the same hopes and aspirations; fears and
concerns and the same right to live in peace and security as us. The only
difference is that we are lucky enough to have been born here.

[Readers note: the writer is a former member of the Sudanese
Communist Party.]

To understand the crisis in Darfur one has to know something
of Darfur itself. Darfur is a large province in western Sudan, bigger than
Britain but with a population smaller than
Scotland. Bordering the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya, it is a
largely desert region interspersed with some of the richest arable farmland in
Africa. Access to this farmland and proximity to these other countries are key
factors in the current crisis. Mostly African rather than Arab, its southern
border marks the boundary between Arab North Africa and the 'african' Africa.

Tribalism

Tribalism dominates politics in Darfur as it does in most of Sudan. This isn't
to say that social, economic and class issues are absent but rather that they
are usually expressed in tribal terms. Central to the current situation has
been a long standing conflict between the dominant Fur tribe, from which Darfur
derives its name, and various Arab tribes known collectively as the Janjaweed.

"Other forces have intervened, intensifying the conflict
to almost genocidal proportions."

The Fur are arable farmers and historically control some of
the richest farmlands and access to water particularly in central Darfur. The
Janjaweed are primarily cattle ranchers moving their herds through Darfur and
Chad and competing with the Fur for access to grazing land and water. This
conflict has been going on since far back in history and has usually been
settled by negotiation and little bloodshed. In recent years, however, other
forces have intervened, intensifying the conflict to almost genocidal
proportions.

DarfurWomanAndChild
Originally a self-governing sultanate, Darfur was
incorporated into British-ruled Sudan in 1916 and became the country's western
province when Sudan achieved independence in 1956. Because of the distance from
the capital, Khartoum, and the weakness of the central state, successive post-colonial
governments have tried to govern Darfur by proxy, establishing alliances with
key tribes and actively intervening to ensure their allies control affairs on
the ground. As all Sudanese governments have been Arab dominated, they have
tended to support Arab rather than African peoples, in Darfur as in other
regions. From independence in 1956 to the military coup in 1989 which overthrew
the government of President Sadiq al Mahdi, Darfur was a relatively peaceful
and stable region with most internal conflicts contained by negotiation and the
region enjoying a large degree of autonomy.

In 1989 the National Islamic Front staged a coup and seized
power in Khartoum. The current crisis in Darfur has its origin in this event.

National Islamic Front

The National Islamic Front [NIF] staged its coup in response to a number of
issues. Khartoum had effectively lost the war in the south to the Sudan Peoples
Liberation Army (SPLA) and the NIF blamed this on the weakness of the
government of Sadiq al Mahdi. Their fear was that other regional forces might
look for greater independence, weakening the state still further. Allied to
this was the rise in strength and influence of the Communist Party which
although only legalized for a few short years had grown into a genuinely mass
organization. With its call for Sudan to become a fully secular state the CPS
was seen as anti- Islamic and a threat to the existing order. The specter of
1971 was also regularly raised when the Communist Party was involved in an
attempt to overthrow the government and seize power.

"The long established policy of supporting Arab tribes in
their conflict over access to land was stepped up."

The National Islamic Front solution was to ban the CPS,
re-launch the war in the South and turn Sudan into a fully fledged Islamic
state. In Darfur, the military coup was treated with complete dismay especially
when it became clear that the government would seek to undermine the region's
autonomy. The long established policy of supporting Arab tribes in their
conflict over access to land was stepped up and attacks by Arab militias
increased. The aim was to make these tribes dominant in Darfur and strengthen
alliances with them. DarfurMap

This came to a head in 2002 when two local rebel groups, the
Justice & Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM),
accused the government of oppressing the non-Arab majority. Although
representing different tribal and geographical areas they were both united in
their desire for greater Darfur autonomy and a return to civilian government in
Khartoum. Within both groups are elements committed to independence for Darfur.
A problem with trying to tie down exactly who rebel groups are is that they are
constantly changing with mergers, divisions and new groups coming onto the
scene all the time.

On the 25th February 2002 a group calling itself the Darfur Liberation Front
launched a successful attack on an army garrison in the Jebel Marrah district.
There then followed a low intensity war between various rebel groups and the
army in which government forces faired extremely badly. The Sudanese army,
poorly equipped and trained, was already stretched by the war in the South.

Proving no match for the rebels the government relied on
aerial bombardment of rebel held areas which had a devastating effect on
civilians. Despite this the government faced a humiliating defeat when on 25^th
April 2003 a joint force of SLM and JEM rebels attacked and destroyed the main
army base in the regional capital, Al Fasher. Having effectively 'lost' the
South to the SPLA the government feared that Darfur was going the same way. By
the summer, government forces
were on the retreat all over Darfur, with the conflict threatening to spill
over into the neighboring
Kordofan region.

Genocide

At this point the government changed tactics. An alliance was forged between
the Janjaweed militia and the government which put the militia at the center of
Khartoum's counter-insurgency strategy. The Janjaweed, already well armed and
organized, were supplied with new weaponry and logistical support. Supported by
Military Intelligence and the air force they began to attack the civilian
population from where the rebels had emerged.

The strategy was both ruthless and amounted to a planned
campaign of genocide. Their tactic was simple. A group of villages would be
identified. The air force would go in first and bomb the villages. The
Janjaweed would then follow raping, killing and generally creating as much
carnage as possible. Those who escaped would become refugees and to make sure
they couldn't return, everything left in the village; houses, crops and
livestock would be destroyed. The tactic began in central Darfur but was soon
rolled out across the entire region.

"The air force would go in first and bomb the villages."

By the spring of 2004 it is estimated that 10,000 people had
been killed and more than a million turned into refugees, causing a major
humanitarian disaster. The conflict then took on an international dimension
when more than 100,000 refugees poured over the border into Chad, pursued by
Janjaweed. In April 2004 Chad brokered a peace deal leading to the signing of
the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the JEM, the SLM and the
government. However, this deal fell apart almost as soon as it was signed,
largely because the government was never really committed to it in the first
place.

This led to a further division in the rebel camp with some
determined to stick to the terms of the agreement and others continuing the
fight. If anything, the Janjaweed campaign was stepped up,which led Kofi Annan,
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to accuse the government in Sudan of
an organized campaign of genocide. Again, under international pressure, another
peace agreement was signed in May 2006, but fell apart for essentially the same
reasons as the first agreement. In fact, it is clear that the only reason the
Sudanese Government signs these treaties is as a sop to international opinion.

The situation today is that Darfur presents one of the
worst humanitarian disasters in the world. Hundreds of thousands of people have
been killed while more than one million have become refugees. Apart from
attacks by the Janjaweed and Government forces many are dying from lack of
food, shelter, medication and sanitation. Even if the conflict were to be
resolved tomorrow it could take years to repairs the damage to the economy and
infrastructure inflicted by the scorched earth policy.

"Sudanese people might be poor and isolated but they are not
stupid and blame the government for the present crisis."

Meanwhile the Khartoum Government is stalling on any future peace initiatives
and actively resisting the sending in of international peacekeepers. The
various rebel groups are divided about what to do. Some want to continue the
fight; others want a negotiated solution in the face of catastrophe. Part of
the problem for the Government is that their very survival depends very much on
achieving 'victory' in Darfur. The coup in 1989 had little support in the
country and relied on a coalition of Islamic, business and army interests for
success. Since then the war in the South has been lost with the government
forced into signing a humiliating peace treaty with the SPLA, the economy
exists at a pitifully low level and further economic development, in particular
the oil industry, is being hampered by political instability.

Internationally the country has never been more isolated,
with even many Islamic states keeping it at arms length due to its operations
in Darfur. The Government has tried to play the nationalist card claiming that
they are victims of an international campaign to subvert the country and that
the anti-government forces in Darfur are being manipulated by foreign powers.
However, the Sudanese people might be poor and isolated but they are not stupid
and blame the government for the present crisis.

Sanctions

Various suggestions have been put forward by the international community to
deal with the crisis. These include sanctions against the regime in Khartoum,
western intervention and or intervention by the African Union. The problem is
that none of these are likely to prove successful. Sanctions, whether political
or economic, would be ineffectual. The regime is already isolated
internationally and the country in such precarious economic state that few
people would notice that sanctions have taken place. In fact, the imposition of
western sanctions might be beneficial to the regime. It would allow them to
attempt to rally the people in the face of an outside threat and help them put
pressure on Islamic and Arab states to give support. Western intervention, in
the form of troops, has never been a serious proposal. To put it quite bluntly,
the West has no economic or strategic interests in Darfur and therefore no reason
to commit troops.

Intervention by the African Union is also likely to prove
ineffectual. The African Union is too politically divided and the forces that
are likely to be committed too meager to make much of a difference.

"What is needed is a return to a broad based civilian government
committed to ending the conflict."

There is at present a limited African Union force tellingly made up mostly of
Rwandan troops. The key to ending the crisis lies in Khartoum. The Islamic
National Front government is clearly struggling and unstable. Its overthrow is
an absolute prerequisite for any settlement in Darfur. What is needed is a
return to a broad based civilian government committed to ending the conflict.
Such a government would end military operations in Darfur, cut off supplies to
the Janjaweed and be a genuine force for reconciliation in the region.

Is the overthrow of the government likely and imminent? The
answer is very likely. The Islamic Front now has little support in the country;
much less than when it seized power in 1989. Ranged against it are a powerful
de-facto alliance including the main opposition Umma Party, the Communist
Party, the SPLA now in complete control of the South and various other regional
forces. There is also evidence of deep divisions within the government and
dissention in the army. Internationally the regime is completely isolated and
with an economy in a perpetual state of crisis. As stated earlier, the coup in
1989 was organized by an alliance of Islamic, army and business forces. There
is growing evidence that key elements in the army and big business have run out
of patience with the regime and are looking for an alternative. The question is
what kind of alternative. For some sections of this ruling group their
opposition is based on the failure of the regime to deliver on its original
program and may look to put in power an army-led government which will continue
with the policies of the regime only more effectively. Others believe that
their interests might be better served by supporting the opposition and helping
to shape any future government they might form.

For Left and progressive forces in Sudan any future government must be based on
a key principle: that the government should be democratic and broad-based, representing a coalition of the disparate
groups and people that make up Sudan and a government which respects regional
autonomy in a secular state. Such a government would forge a new alliance with
the regions based on equality and partnership. They see this as the
prerequisite for tackling the many problems of this vast country and ultimately
of moving the country in the direction of socialism.

Bill Bonnar lived and worked in Darfur for
almost three years up to 1989 and was a member of the Sudanese Communist Party
which was then going through one of its brief periods of legality. He left the
country following the military coup in 1989 when the Communist Party was
banned.

Do you need and appreciate Black Agenda Report articles? Please click on the DONATE icon, and help us out, if you can.

More Stories