UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Editing: Guilhem Dorandeu/Photos: AFP for L'Orient Le Jour
Israel's recognition of a breakaway region in Somalia has redrawn the map of the Horn of Africa, pitting two oil-rich Gulf powers against each other and forcing the U.S. to delay its imperial plans for Iran.
On December 26, 2025, Israel ignited chaos in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement that he was recognizing “Somaliland,” a secessionist enclave in Northern Somalia. “Somaliland” has sought state recognition since 1991, but Israel is the first to give it to them.
Israel’s action inspired two new regional alliances and ratcheted up the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Saudi Arabia now leads an alliance including Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Djibouti and Qatar. The UAE and Israel lead the other, which includes Ethiopia and Kenya.
As a result, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey refused to allow America access to their airspace to attack Iran, forcing President Donald Trump to call off an operation that could have led to regime change in Tehran and even more chaos in the region. While battling for influence in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea, gulf states were very concerned with the start of new conflict in Iran.
With new US attacks on Iran postponed for the time being, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are deploying their oil wealth to gain influence and pursue their competing interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia has the world’s second largest proven oil reserves, more than 267,000 million barrels, while the UAE has the world’s sixth largest, 113,000 million barrels.
The UAE: Arming and Funding secessionist movements throughout the Red Sea and the Horn
The UAE is a small Gulf state, a federation of seven Emirates based on seven powerful tribes. It has only 1.5 million citizens and nearly 10 million migrant workers from around the globe toiling to support the country’s role as a prominent trading hub.
During the past 20 years, it has been on a buying spree, funding destabilization and a vast network of secessionists and proxy forces in Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia to reflect its own loosely federated system of government. The UAE projects loosely federated mini states as future economic trade partners.
The UAE has also built a strong relationship with Israel. On September 15, 2020, in a ceremony at the White House, the UAE and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords, becoming the first Gulf state to recognize and fully normalize relations with Israel since Jordan in 1994. They are among the six of 22 states in the Arab League that recognize Israel.
The Abraham Accords are intended to normalize relations between the Muslim nations and Israel without the recognition of Palestine.
The UAE has also been a major buyer of American weapons for many years. By these purchases and its alliance with Israel, it has backfilled Isreal’s bunker buster bombs stockpile during the Gaza genocide.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has a population of roughly 35 million citizens. Saudi Arabia generously spends its petrodollars on American made military hardware.
Saudi Arabia is also home to the two holiest sites for Muslims around the world,Mecca and Medina. Thus, the country has been more discreet in its dealings with Israel and the Palestinian cause.
Israel’s foray into the Horn of Africa by recognizing the Northern Somalia secessionist region “Somaliland” which sits on the Red Sea exposed a fault line between Saudi Arabia and UAE. The UAE operating a secessionist network combined with its historical ties with Israel including being a signatory to the Abraham Accords, startled Saudi Arabia which saw the move as an existential threat.
Saudi Arabia Airforce immediately bombed the Southern Transition Council (STC), a secessionist group in the port city of Mukalla, Yemen, destroying a UAE weapon stockpile. STC collapsed and the UAE withdrew from Yemen within a week.
Once Saudi Arabia drove the UAE out of Yemen, it proceeded to dismantle the Rapid Support Force (RSF). The RSF has been vanguard for the UAE in its destabilization project in Sudan.
Saudi Arabia purchased a fresh set of weapons from Pakistan worth $2 billion for the Sudanese national army and urged Egypt, which has been reluctant to get involved in Sudan conflict militarily, to close supply routes through Libya into Sudan for the RFS. The effect in the conflict has been immediate.
The Sudanese army turned the tide on RSF by recapturing large swaths of territory and driving the militia group out of the capital Khartoum. Sudan’s internationally recognized government returned to Khartoum for the first time in years.
In Somalia, Saudi Arabia sought travel sanctions on secessionist leaders in “Somaliland.” Countries in the Arab League obliged.
Saudi Arabia also pressured Somalia’s corrupt and unpopular weak president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to cancel all defense and port operation agreements with the UAE. Mohamud complied.
The UAE started evacuating personnel from Berbera port and began disassembling radar and other heavy equipment in Bossaso. The Bossaso airport serves as a hub for the UAE to supply the RSF with weapons and mercenaries. The UAE also airlifted personnel and equipment from Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia to Addis Sababa, the capital of Ethiopia.
The UAE and its proxies have been on retreat since Israel’s action recognizing Somaliland. However, the UAE and its alliance met in its capital city Abu Dhabi, but not much is known except Ethiopia dispatched its head of intelligence to Mogadishu.
Ethiopia's intelligence chief delivered a message to Somalia’s president to reconcile with the UAE and reverse his course of action. But Saudi Arabia followed up with a phone call and once more pressured Mohamud to hold a press conference eliminating any ambiguity. Mohamud held the press conference and reassured Saudi Arabia that Somalia is clearly in the Saudi camp.
The rupture of Saudi Arabia and UAE relations has had an immediate impact on conflict riddled countries in the Horn of Africa and on the Red Sea. But the rivalry is unlikely to fundamentally change relationships among members of the two newly emerged alliances.
The UAE has large investment portfolios in Egypt and Türkiye. Both countries view economic ties with the UAE as indispensable.
Saudi Arabia infuses large amounts of money, if not more, as the UAE into Ethiopia's economy. Ethiopia, a country with its own proxies in Sudan and Somalia, is limited in its ability to follow the UAE lead in the region.
Kenya, another country with a shaky economy in the Horn of Africa, is between a rock and hard place. Kenya recently delayed signing a free trade agreement with China under pressure from the U.S. China considers “Somaliland” a renegade region like Taiwan and it is increasingly at odds with the U.S. on the issue of separatism.
Israel's recognition of “Somaliland” in Northern Somalia has triggered new resistance. It has exposed a fault line between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and led to two new alliances, one led by Saudi Arabia and the other led by the UAE. The realignment impacted the U.S. war plans with Iran at the behest of Israel and delayed military action for the time being.
The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not over although for now Saudi Arabia is dominant. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the various secessionist groups including Somaliland, are all lobbying in Western capitals, most of all the US.
Jamal Abdulahi is a Somali American software engineer and writer based in Minneapolis. He is currently CEO of a digital healthcare firm dedicated to increasing access in historically disadvantaged communities. His work has appeared in many publications, including the Minneapolis Star Tribune & LA Times. He can be reached on X, formerly Twitter, @fuguni.