by Dr. Mtangulizi Sanyika
New Orleans has its first white mayor in 32 years, but that doesn’t mean the city has entered a “post-racial” era. Mitch Landrieu won a landslide with a majority of the Black vote, but whites remain highly reluctant to vote for Black candidates that African American majorities can support. “Race was a factor in 2010 and it will remain a factor in future elections, unless power and wealth are more democratically distributed to eliminate racial disparities and class inequalities.”
The Elite Re-Capture New Orleans City Hall: End Of An Era, Beginning Of An Era. A Definitive Analysis
byDr. Mtangulizi Sanyika
“After two decades of trying, the elites had finally re-captured city hall and did so with a White candidate and an extraordinary Black majority coalition.”
The recent municipal election in New Orleans was a needed change for some, a bitter disappointment for others and a radical surprise to all. The election of Mitch Landrieu as the first White mayor of the city since his father Moon Landrieu held the office in 1978 represented a dramatic reversal of the city’s politics, the resurgence of the White elite and some would say the end of Black dominated racialized politics.
New Orleans has now joined the list or other majority or plurality Black cities that elected White mayors after a long unbroken cycle of electing Black mayors, cities such as Oakland, Baltimore, St. Louis, Cleveland and Gary. However, what distinguishes New Orleans in this process of returning to direct White control is that Mitch Landrieu received an unprecedented 66 percent of the Black votes cast in the election–a landslide. Despite Landrieu’s landslide victory among both Black and White voters, it is this writer’s view that the millennium has not arrived, nor has this election ended Black politics. The reality is New Orleans is not yet a post-racial city. In the mayor’s race, Black voters crossed over, but White voters did not cross over in equal proportion, nor did they cross over in district races. Most importantly, the causes and sources of Black inequality have not been eliminated, nor have the disparities that negatively impact the quality of life of everyday Black Orleanians.
“Landrieu’s promise to share political and economic power with the Black community will be the measure of his administration.”
What we witnessed in the 2010 election was the culmination of a process that began three decades ago when Ernest N. "Dutch” Morial first desegregated the office of mayor. The White elites of the city never intended to relinquish the mayoralty to the Black majority, and they have been attempting to reclaim the office ever since. In every election since Dutch won, their direct strategy has been to run one or more preferred White candidates, while their indirect strategy has been to support a Black candidate perceived as favorable to their interests. The election of Mitch Landrieu in his third attempt is a confirmation of this hypothesis regardless of any formal statements to the contrary.
The recapture of city hall is a punctuation mark–the end of one cycle and the beginning of another. If Landrieu governs through policies that support African American interests, then he will follow in the positive tradition of his Black predecessors. On the other hand, if he governs through policies that primarily suit White business elite interests, he will repudiate his Black predecessors and most certainly be a one-term mayor. His promise to share political and economic power with the Black community will be the measure of his administration. A review of previous mayoral elections from 1977 to the present will further illuminate the recapture strategy of the elites.
Past Mayoral Elections 1977-2010
The Dutch Morial Era, 1978-1984:
The Beginning Of The Franchise
The mayoral election of 1977 pitted Dutch Morial (a civil rights icon who was exceptionally well qualified) against a field of well known White candidates in the primary. The most notable were state Rep Toni Morrison, state Senator Nat Kiefer (the two White moderates) and city councilman at-large Joe DiRosa (the White conservative).
Dutch entered the primary with deep support among grass roots and civil rights sympathizers, but divided loyalties among the newer Black political organizations. The Louisiana Weekly and most of the newer groups supported Kiefer, while Moon Landrieu (Mitch’s father) and older Black groups backed Morrison.
The 1977 primary was a struggle for the loyalty of the Black vote which appeared split between Dutch and the two White moderates. At the end of the day, Dutch topped the field with 26.6 percent of the primary vote to face DiRosa who finished second, while Kiefer and Morrison eliminated each other. However in the runoff, Morial emerged decisively, capturing 51.8 percent to DiRosa’s 48.2 percent, including 97 percent of a 78 percent Black turnout and 20 percent of a 75 percent White turnout. Morial won despite division among the leading Black organizations and the strong challenge of three White candidates. The White establishment regarded Dutch as too arrogant and abrasive (read decisive and strong), whereas Black politicos regarded him as too independent (read unwilling to bargain with them.)
“If White voters could no longer elect a White mayor, the next best thing was to elect a Black candidate who would govern like a White mayor.”
This division extended into the 1982 election as well, in which William Jefferson (who later became congressman) backed by the newer Black groups, ran against Dutch in the primary along with White challenger Ron Faucheux. Dutch won the primary with 47 percent of the vote to Fauheux’s 43 percent and Jefferson’s 7 percent. In the runoff once again, the new Black groups split between Dutch and Faucheux, but Dutch won handily with 53.4 percent of the vote, including 97 percent of the Black vote, but only 13 percent of the White vote (as opposed to 20 percent in his first race).
In both his terms, Dutch promoted a DBE strategy and expanded Black city contracts from $17,000 to $11 million, although downtown development bypassed the Black community. City hall employment dramatically increased; however management of White police conduct left a lot to be desired.
The lessons from the Dutch Morial era are: 1) Black voters make their own decisions despite the position of Black political groups, 2) White voters tend to prefer a White candidate when faced with a choice between a Black and White candidate for mayor, 3) race coupled with other factors may influence racial crossover voting patterns in New Orleans elections, 4) White elites are likely to oppose a Black mayor whose policies or style favors the Black majority, and 5) candidates of the elites are likely to make the runoff.
The Sidney Barthelemy Era, 1986-1994
After the Morial years, The White establishment was seeking a candidate thought of as less aggressive, less abrasive, and more accommodating to their interests and style. In the views of some pundits, if White voters could no longer elect a White mayor, the next best thing was to elect a Black candidate who would govern like a White mayor. In stepped Sidney Barthelemy of COUP, who was an at-large councilperson who had demonstrated his ability to work within a predominantly White coalition. His leading opponent was William Jefferson, who was perceived as the Black candidate endorsed by Dutch and most Black grassroots organizations. Barthelemy won the runoff with 57 percent of the total vote; however, he only captured 29 percent of the Black vote, but received 88 percent of the White vote.
As things turned out, Barthelemy was not the mayor the White community expected: murder and crime rates went up, as did White unemployment rates. However, it was his unexpected support for affirmative action in the private sector, increased minority business share and equal opportunity in city contracts, and the continuing increase in Black employment and decrease in White employment in city hall that crystallized the opposition of the White elites.
“White support of a Black mayor is fragile and subject to reversal when he/she advocates for Black rights and opportunity.”
For instance, between 1986 and 1989 alone, some $116 million was awarded to minority and women contractors. All of this led to the collapse of Sidney’s biracial coalition such that by 1990, he ran with limited White support and overwhelming Black support. By the time of the 1990 election, Barthelemy had become the overwhelming favorite of the Black community and was endorsed by all major Black political organizations and leaders. He ran without Black opposition, but faced major White opposition in Donald Mintz (a Jewish lawyer-businessman,) who would seek the office again in 1994. Barthelemy won outright in the first primary capturing 54 percent of the vote to Mintz’ 44 percent; thus thwarting the direct strategy of recapturing city hall with a White candidate.
The lessons from the Barhelemy era are: 1) predominantly White biracial electoral coalitions will not always indicate how a mayor will govern 2) White support of a Black mayor is fragile and subject to reversal when he/she advocates for Black rights and opportunity and 3) race alone is not a predictor of political behavior. Whites thought they had recaptured city hall only to discover the opposite–that Barthelemy did what was right, not what was White.
The Marc Morial Era, 1994-2002
After its failure to recapture or control city hall with a Black candidate, the elites then focused on the election of 1994 in which there were 10 candidates for mayor: five Black and five White including two “giants” in New Orleans politics–state Senator Marc Morial, the son of Dutch Morial, and then state Rep Mitch Landrieu, the son of Moon Landrieu. In addition a third major White candidate, Donald Mintz (who had run against Barthelemy,) entered the race as the reform candidate running on a platform of good government and economic development. Despite the fact that Black people were 65 percent of the total population and 59 percent of the registered voters, the elites once again made a serious bid to recapture city hall.
Barthelemy was assailed for lack of leadership, and for responsibilty for the turbulent times, the out-of-control murder rates and rampant drug use; thus implying that a change was needed (perhaps to a White mayor to restore stability). Many White voters also accused the Barthelemy administration of corruption, incompetence and inefficiency. This logic sounds remarkably similar to the logic in the recent mayoral election in which a Black mayor (C. Ray Nagin) was blamed for every city problem, leading to a search for the next great White hope.
However, in 1994, two questions were on the table: would the historic Black love affair with Dutch be more powerful than its romance with Moon which would affect Mitch’s chances and secondly, could Mintz convince enough White and especially Black voters that he was the answer to the problems facing the city. In the primary, Mintz led with 37 percent of the total vote, with Marc capturing 32 percent, catapulting them both into the runoff, while Mitch finished a distant third with about ten percent of the vote. In the primary, Marc won 88 percent of the Black vote but only 7 percent of the White vote; thus confirming the apprehension of White voters and the power elites regarding Black mayors
The remarkable irony of the 1994 campaign is its striking resemblance to the 2010 mayoral election. Mintz ran a highly deracialized campaign focusing on what he thought voters shared in common and less on their differences (i.e. race and class) in an attempt to bring the races together.
The debate centered on whether voters should turn to a White mayor or maintain the continuity of “the franchise" with a Black mayor. Paraphrasing The New Orleans Tribune, which editoralized at the time, “to those who say that after 16 years Blacks should give up city hall because of a failure to solve the urgent problems of the day, 16 years is a short time in the 275-year history of the city, and that those problems being faced now are the result of 200 years of slavery, poverty, miseducation and economic deprivation.”
“It appeared that New Orleans may have begun a new White racial voting pattern in its politics and that White voters were beginning to accept a Black mayor who was also acceptable to the Black majority.”
Mintz ran a campaign based on crime reduction, educational improvement, economic development and neighborhood revitalization (sounds similar to Landrieu’s priorities in 2010). One study even claimed that Mintz had the lead among older Blacks who were disillusioned by corruption in the Barthelemy administration and were skeptical of Marc’s youth and were thus leaning toward Mintz. However, a major racial scandal erupted during his campaign that reminded Black voters of the attempted White takeover.
In the runoff, Marc captured 54.5 percent of the total vote with 88 percent of the Black vote and 7.3 percent of the White vote, once again thwarting the attempted White recapture of city hall. In other words, roughly 93 percent of White voters voted for the White candidate. This is remarkably similar to the 2010 election result in which 93 percent of all White voters voted for one of the White candidates for mayor.
Marc governed the city with the passion of his father, the shrewdness of a seasoned politician, and the efficiency of a competent public administrator by including all factions and constituencies in his administration. Crime and murders dropped significantly, while unemployment dropped to a 15-year low. As a result, in his 1998 reelection bid, he ran without Black opposition in the primary and minimum White opposition and captured 79 percent of the total vote, including over 90 percent of the Black vote and 38 percent of the White vote. This latter figure of 38 percent was dramatically up from the seven percent of the White vote that he received in his 1994 run. During his second term, the crime rate plummeted, unemployment declined, and his approval rating ranged between 52 to 59 percent. It appeared that New Orleans may have begun a new White racial voting pattern in its politics and that White voters were beginning to accept a Black mayor who was also acceptable to the Black majority. Yet when he attempted a charter revision to seek a third term, the voters soundly defeated it by 69 percent to 31 percent, just as they had done to his father’s attempt earlier.
Despite the accomplishments of the Morial administration, by the end of his second term, cries of corruption, patronage and cronyism were rampant among the elites. Once again the familiar pattern had set in–darling of the elites today, corrupt politician tomorrow, thus necessitating a “new savior” to rescue the city.
The lessons learned from the Marc Morial era are: 1) the Black vote remained as the base of a Black politicians in New Orleans, 2) the White vote for a Black mayor preferred by the Black majority was capable of expanding under certain circumstances i.e. White voters will make a strategic adjustment 3) the elites eventually desert a Black politician if a program to increase Black city contractors and wealth sharing is implemented
The C. Ray Nagin Years, 2002-2010
The mayoral primary of 2002 attracted 15 candidates. Only five of them were major, all of whom were also Black: C. Ray Nagin (a businessman), Richard Pennington (Morial’s police chief and surrogate), Paulette Irons (a state Senator), Jim Singleton (an at-large councilman and Morial opponent) and Ken Carter (a councilman from a biracial district.) Now the elites were faced with a situation similar to 1986. Lacking a serious White contender, they chose the “Black” candidate that they felt most comfortable with ideologically, politically and temperamentally, C. Ray Nagin.
Nagin, a mid-manager with Cox Communications lacked any political, civil rights or community based experience. Economic development dominated the campaign discussion, particularly the city’s contracting and DBE process. Nagin promised a thorough six-month review of contracts, to cut contracts, reduce unclassified positions by 20 percent, and a clean-up of city hall to make it "business friendly." On the other hand, Pennington promised to continue the policies of the Morial administration, while Carter, Irons and Singleton attacked the contracting policies of the Morial administration and promised varying levels of reform.
Nagin finished first in the primary with 29 percent of the vote, (including 50 percent of the White vote,) followed by Pennington (a Morial surrogate) with 23 percent, Irons with 18 percent, Singleton with 13 percent, and Carter with 10 percent.
In the runoff with Pennington, Nagin continued to build his White dominated biracial coalition in contrast to Pennington who clearly appealed to the majority Black population. Nagin’s intention to run on a platform to run the city like a business and clean up corruption. He won the runoff by 59 percent to Pennington’s 41 percent, garnering 86 percent of the White vote and 25 percent of the Black vote, enough for victory.
“Ray Nagin was the mayor during Katrina which changed him personally and destroyed his biracial coalition forever.”
During his first term in office, he advocated many policies preferred by the White business community and some policies advocated by Black businesses. However, he was most noted for his attacks on and cancellation of the ten DBE contracts executed by Morial, the attacks on taxi cab permitting, his intent to lift the residency rule, his support for state takeover of the schools, and a perception that he opened the door for investigation of Black leaders. All of these policies were perceived as attacks on Black interests and provoked an intensely negative reaction among Black politicos, leaders, clergy and activists. Just as in 1986 when they elected Barthelemy, the White elites were overjoyed that they had once again found their “Black” mayor to represent their interests.
As Nagin’s first term was nearing its end in 2005 substantial opposition had begun to emerge among the Black middle class, activists, professionals, grass roots organizations, public housing residents and the ministers who accused him of being a “White man in Black skin.” However, on August 29, 2005, a category 5 hurricane and flood struck New Orleans and forever changed the city’s history. Ray Nagin was the mayor during Katrina which changed him personally and destroyed his biracial coalition forever.
Nagin was partially blamed for the debacle of Katrina, although the federal and state government bears the primary responsibility for the failure to respond promptly to the disaster. Despite his performance during the disaster, it was his post-Katrina reaction that reversed his political fortune among both Black and White constituents.
At a private meeting in Dallas, the elites declared that the demographic makeup of New Orleans (read racial and class makeup) must change for them to return. The White elites had concluded that the Lower 9 and New Orleans East were not suitable for rebuilding and should be converted to green space, swampland or theme parks (footprint reduction) and that many Black middle class and low income Black people should not be allowed to rerun and rebuild. This was a key recommendation of the land use committee of the Nagin-appointed Bring New Orleans Back Committee which became the lightening rod for Black opposition to the elite vision of the recovery.
To his credit, Nagin opposed the recommendations and invited the Black Diaspora to return to the city and rebuild its neighborhoods. This message was powerfully articulated in the now famous “chocolate city” comment which alienated the White community, but excited Black Orleanians across the country. The “chocolate city” comment drew the line and immediately made Nagin the antichrist for some and the messiah for others. History dramatically changed with that one comment.
The stage was now set for the election which attracted 22 candidates, six of whom were considered major, including: Rev. Tom Watson (a Black challenger), Mitch Landrieu (the Lt. Gov.,) Ron Forman (of the Audubon Institute), Virginia Boulet (a lawyer), and Rob Couhig (a Republican advocate of footprint reduction). Black voters were scattered around the country and counting their vote became a civil rights issue leading to a national demonstration across the Crescent City Connection that attracted 10,000 marchers. The state ruled that satellite voting could only take place at selected locations within the state which led to extensive busing into the city on election day from Houston, Atlanta, Baton Rouge, Jackson, Memphis and other nearby locations.
When the dust cleared, Nagin topped the ticket with 39 percent of the overall vote (including 66 percent of the Black vote) with Landrieu finishing second with 28 percent, (including 20-25 percent of the Black vote) followed by Forman with 17 percent, Boulet with seven percent, Couhig with six percent, Watson with one percent. Once again, the elites who had overwhelmingly supported him in his first run now abandoned him by the thousands and split their votes as indicated above. They then rallied behind Landrieu while Black voters rallied to Nagin’s cause and put him over the top in the runoff 52 to 48 percent.
The “franchise” was saved despite Katrina and the collapse of Nagin’s White dominated biracial coalition. In the runoff with Landrieu, Nagin won by 52 percent to 48 percent. This time around, he won with 88 percent of the Black vote and 20 percent of the White vote. The elites were furious and frustrated that the prize they won four years earlier had once again eluded their grasp similar to their 1990 experience with Barthelemy.
“The ‘franchise’ was saved despite Katrina and the collapse of Nagin’s White dominated biracial coalition.”
The next four years of his administration were spent focusing on the recovery as the defining issue for all Orleanians. During his second term, he frequently battled with the White media, and was often the subject of harsh criticism, second guessing and a general sense that he was incompetent and out-of-control. Despite evidence that he managed the city’s resources well and helped to guide the city through one of the worst disasters in America under extraordinary constraints, he was rarely applauded publically for any accomplishments.
The resistance and incompetency of the federal and state government were often overlooked as primary factors contributing to the slower pace of citywide and neighborhood recovery. The stage was being set to accuse Nagin and Black political leadership as corrupt, unethical, incompetent, untrustworthy and incapable of governing. To be sure, several high profile Black elected officials were indicted and confessed to transgressions that were inappropriate, immoral and illegal.
The lessons from the Nagin era are: 1) White elites will continue their indirect strategy of support for Black candidates who support their interests 2) the White elites will abandon Black politicians who support Black interests 3) race may be a highly volatile variable during an election and 4) the elites will discredit and attack Black leaders and accuse them of incompetency when they act decisively to advance Black interests, and they will attempt to persuade the general public that non-Black officials are more experienced and thus preferred.
The 2010 Election
Question about who would succeed Nagin emerged as the hot topic of political conversation without a clear favorite emerging. As the filing deadline neared, the names of State Senator Ed Murray, Mitch Landrieu, businessman John Georges and the Republican Rob Couhig were among the most frequently mentioned names. Murray declared early, Landrieu played coy and Georges and Couhig announced. Eventually seven major candidates filed including four Black candidates: State Senator Ed Murray, James Perry (nonprofit advocate), Nadine Ramsey (a judge and the only woman), Troy Henry (a businessman), and three White candidates: Landrieu, Georges and Couhig. Everyone thought that the field was set earlier with Murray emerging as the consensus leading Black candidate; however, after much speculation and vacillation, Landrieu entered the contest the last week before filing which dramatically changed the dynamics. Pollsters and pundits now speculated that Landrieu was the undisputed frontrunner followed by Georges and Murray, a distant third.
Murray who was the unenthusiastic choice of many Black leaders suddenly and unexpectedly dropped out of the race after the filing deadline citing the spurious explanation of a funding crisis and a desire to avoid vicious racial conflicts during the campaign. His withdrawal left the Black community in disarray without a consensus candidate and no clear epicenter for its political energy. The three remaining Black candidates were qualified, but inexperienced with virtually no name recognition and limited funding. The jockeying to capture the Black vote vacated by Murray became an intense battle between the three remaining Black candidates–Henry, Ramsey and Perry; and Landrieu and Georges. It was assumed that Landrieu had already claimed 20 to 25 percent based on this 2002 performance; thus, the question now was how the remaining Black vote would be distributed between the Black candidates, and Georges.
“Landrieu swept the field in the first primary with over 60 percent of the total vote and most shocking a 66 percent landslide among Black voters.”
Pollsters and pundits were claiming that Landrieu had from 35 to 40 percent of the total with the battle for second place between Henry and Georges.
The public had also been warned that two-thirds of the voters could be distracted by the Super Bowl (the day after the election) and Mardi Gras preparations (the Tuesday after the election). Much to everyone’s surprise (including this writer), Landrieu swept the field in the first primary with over 60 percent of the total vote and most shocking a 66 percent landslide among Black voters. To be sure, the overall turnout was only 32 percent and closer to 25-29 percent among Black voters
The circle was now complete–after two decades of trying, the elites had finally re-captured city hall and did so with a White candidate and an extraordinary Black majority coalition resembling his Moon Landrieu's feats of decades prior.
Turnout would argue that a confluence of several factors converged simultaneously and thus convinced Black voters to cross over. Among these were the assassination of Black political leaders and the belief that we have reached a post racial society in New Orleans. However, this writer contends that the Black voter displayed a cross-racial voting behavior and that White voters in the mayor's race, the at-large council race and the District B race displayed their traditional race centered voting pattern. When faced with a choice between Black candidates and well known White candidates the White voter voted White. There are numerous theories regarding why Black voters crossed over in such a dramatic fashion. This writer contends that Black voters were: 1) frustration with the pace of the recovery, 2) disappointed with failure of Black leadership such as the devastating withdrawal of Murray from the race 3) convinced that perhaps a White mayor could get the job done with less resistance and 4) comfortable with the Landrieu name and legacy absent a seasoned, credible Black candidate.
While the data analysis is not complete, it is clear that Black voters crossed over by the thousands, but only seven percent of White voters voted for one of the Black candidates for mayor.
In the council-at-large race, Willard-Lewis received fewer White voters compared to the Black votes received by her opponents. Couple this with the manipulation of the voting machines that intimidated many voters into voting for two candidates when they intended to vote only for her and a loss is the result. Not only was the mayoralty recaptured, but so was the council which three years ago was four Black, three White and is now five White and two Black, thanks to Katrina and turnout
“Black voters crossed over by the thousands, but only seven percent of White voters voted for one of the Black candidates for mayor.”
These data suggest that Black voters crossed over, but when faced with a choice between competitive Black and White candidates, White voters did not cross over. Race was a factor in 2010 and it will remain a factor in future elections, unless power and wealth are more democratically distributed to eliminate racial disparities and class inequalities. New Orleans is not yet a post racial society. That will be a major challenge for this mayor.
Implications for the Future
FIRST and foremost, city hall has changed hands, but how will this change affect the lives of everyday citizens who require government intervention to improve the quality of their lives? As indicated earlier, if the Mayor-elect does not respond to the needs of the Black electorate, he is certain to be a one-term mayor. The history of other cities suggests that the majority Black electorate is likely to elect a Black mayor after the Landrieu era, either four years or eight years from now.
SECONDLY, in the future, African Americans should be far more circumspect regarding their choice of candidates for major offices. It may be unwise to assume that a single candidate will be the standard bearer for Black community interests. Perhaps we should return to agenda building, community conventions and even the “Black primary” to screen candidates based on their advancing solid platforms that address our needs. However, the Murray disaster makes it clear, Black CITIZENS MUST fund their candidates if accountability and community loyalty are expected
THIRDLY, Ray Nagin was neither a perfect mayor nor a total failure. Although he did not accomplish every objective, he should be acknowledged for insuring that Black and low income citizens were welcome to return after Karina and he stood his ground a against the White power elites. The chocolate city remark was not buffoonery, rather it was shrewd politics spoken in the Black vernacular. Black folks understood it, and Whites did as well. Which is why they viciously turned on him. He managed the city’s money well, and the streets are finally being fixed. But let’s be clear, he made mistakes and leaves office with many unaccomplished objectives, as was true of each of his predecessors. President Obama has unfrozen about $2 billion for the recovery which will be available to the Landrieu administration which will be given the credit for projects and programs initiated under Nagin. Let’s hope that the dollars reach the neighborhoods and the people.
FOURTHLY, racism and class inequalities will persist under Landrieu. African Americans should expect/demand that Landrieu vigorously attack all forms of inequality and discrimination in local government, and the private sector. The office of mayor cannot and will not solve all problems of any group. What is expected is that the mayor will use his bully pulpit against inequality and advocate for inclusion and participation in wealth creation and power sharing as he promised during the campaign.
FINALLY, African Americans and all other progressive, conscious citizens should monitor this administration and its policy behavior. When it does well, it should be applauded; however when it fails to deliver to those who need the most help, citizens should be vigorous in their criticism. African Americans have an agenda of interests regardless of who is the mayor. Gains are only achieved when citizens take responsibility for their own interests and not assume that government alone will bring about basic change.
The business interests and White elites have their mayor, the question is whether he will also be the mayor of the Black majority that elected him with 66 percent of its votes. That is certain to be his historic challenge.
Dr. Mtangulizi Sanyika is Project Manager of the African American Leadership Project (AALP) andProfessor of African World Studies, Dillard University.