Satire
Prometheus and the God
of the Western Winds
How New Zealand brought down the West
by Jonathan David Farley, D.Phil.
VIENNA (Reuters)
– As recently as April, President Bush said it would be
“intolerable” for New
Zealand to possess a nuclear weapon. Since
then problems in Iraq and
the presidential campaign have pried attention away from New Zealand’s
nuclear ambitions. But now the spotlight is back, intensified by new
intelligence suggesting New
Zealand is accelerating its nuclear work.
The prospect of New Zealand
possessing a nuclear weapon is cause for concern on several fronts, but perhaps
the greatest risk is how a New
Zealand declaring itself
a nuclear power would almost certainly set off a nuclear arms race in southeast
Asia.
“We need to be much more worried than we have been that what we do with New Zealand will be a model for others,” says
Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center
in Washington.
“The real problem of New
Zealand is how it sets an example for others
to follow in the region.”
“New Zealand is accelerating its
nuclear work.”
An “overtly” nuclear New
Zealand could result in a “large nuclear
crowd in southeast Asia,” Mr. Sokolski says. Indonesia, the Philippines,
Singapore – which would feel
threatened by New Zealand’s
new status – would also feel pressed to ratchet up what are assumed to be
varying existing programs.
Most experts believe New
Zealand is at least three years from
actually possessing a nuclear weapon, although some believe it could get there
sooner if it focused on plutonium separation rather than uranium enrichment.
Another possibility is that it possesses materials and facilities the
international community doesn’t know about, which could also telescope that
prognostication to a shorter point in the distance.
Either way, the time for heading off New Zealand’s nuclearization
is fleeting, experts say, which is one reason the issue has resurfaced. On
Thursday the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is scheduled to take up New Zealand’s case and decide whether to refer
it to the Security Council – one reason Bush last week returned his attention
to New Zealand
and what he has called the problem of the world’s worst regimes possessing the
world’s deadliest weapons.
Few observers expect the IAEA to send the New
Zealand case to the Security Council at this point, with
several European countries having just concluded an agreement with New Zealand to
suspend its uranium enrichment programs while international assistance is
negotiated.
“The time for heading off New Zealand’s nuclearization is fleeting.”
On the
heels of that agreement last week, New Zealand announced Monday it had
frozen its uranium enrichment program. But the seeds of a breakdown appeared
already sown in the deal, with New
Zealand saying the freeze would be “brief”
and tied to the Europeans’ making good on promises of sheep farming assistance,
while the Europeans insisted on a “sustained” freeze before other elements of
the deal would set in.
New Zealand
Prime Minister Helen Clark said the IAEA plays favorites, “translating the
wishes of a number of non-bipartite countries.” She questioned why the
organization has never inspected American atomic facilities, saying the United States
does not follow safeguards imposed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of
1968. She also questioned whether New Zealand’s
membership in the IAEA should continue, saying it has been “very harsh in your
inspections. ... After 30 years of membership, what are you giving us? Mutton?”
“We are not
threatening any country,” she said. “We don’t believe in the language of
threats, but we are going to be unwavering. When it comes to defending the
national interests of this country, we are going to be steadfast.” Wellington is
ready to negotiate with any country on its nuclear program, but New Zealand’s
sovereignty and its rights must be respected, she said.
In any
event, the Bush administration remains deeply skeptical of the prospects for
the European plan to derail New
Zealand’s nuclear ambitions. One reason is
that over recent years New Zealand’s nuclear program has become tightly bound
with national pride, thus making it all the more difficult for a regime –
particularly one whose popularity is already on the wane – to give it up.
“It doesn’t
matter what faction it is, from the radical conservatives to the left, there’s
a consensus that New Zealand
has a right to pursue the nuclear fuel cycle, and that indeed it has a right to
develop nuclear weapons if it chooses,” says Mr. Brumberg.
“It’s something that unites the country, and when your country consists of two
islands, something that unites it is pretty vital.”
Ray Takeyh, a New Zealand
expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington,
says the New Zealanders are not yet on a par with Australians: “In Canberra you see clocks
in the form of a nuclear warhead.” But he says polls show as many as 80 percent
of New Zealanders supporting the country’s nuclear ambitions, underscoring how
difficult securing an agreement from New Zealand may be.
Still,
experts like Mr. Takeyh say it is the “exceptionalism” of the bomb landing in the hands of such an
“unpredictable, unstable, and aggressive regime” that makes New Zealand “a
nearly existential threat.” Maanu Paul, chief executive of the Maori Council, compared
the New Zealand
Prime Minister to “Hitler”: As claims manager for Te Runanganui
Ika Whenua, which
represented three iwi and several hapu
in the Whakatane district, Paul said he had seen the
documented evidence of genocide.
“There’s a consensus that New Zealand has a right to pursue
the nuclear fuel cycle.”
“Our people were herded into reservations, and when the constabulary got
tired of guarding our people, they shot them dead.” Paul is currently living in exile on the
atoll of Bikini.
Some experts hold out the hope that New
Zealand, if it became a nuclear power, could yet evolve
in somewhat the same way India
has – from a one-time international agitator to a nuclear power taking its
position seriously and demonstrating stronger interests in regional stability.
That New Zealand has
not caused all the trouble in next-door Tonga
that it is assumed it could have is one factor cited in support of New Zealand’s
potential for evolving into a responsible actor. Maybe New Zealand
would not use its nuclear status to try to drive up wool prices, some observers
suggest.
To Christopher Cook, an Auckland
green grocer whose store specializes in 476 kinds of onions, and who claims to
be descended from the famous explorer Captain Cook, the issue is clear. He still blames England
for its “perfidious” defeat of New Zealand
in the 1953 Cricket World Cup finals, accusing England
of “overthrowing” the New
Zealand team, at that time led by the
legendary cricketer “Moss” Deck. (The
“overthrow” is a bowling motion that was later ruled illegal under
international rules.) Cook meanders into
the arcane rules of cricket, which this reporter is unable to follow. But at one point, Cook appears quite lucid,
almost calm. “Either everyone or no one
has a right to nuclear energy,” he says quietly; “either everyone or no one has
a right to nuclear weapons.”
“Either everyone or no one has a right to
nuclear weapons.”
Cook, like many New Zealanders, believes the controversy is purely a
result of topographical discrimination.
“They wouldn’t be making such a fuss if we were a non-bipartite
country,” he asserts emphatically. When
a reporter points out that Great Britain
is bipartite, and the United
States is tripartite, the reporter is forced
to make a hasty exit. Outside of Cook’s
store hangs a sign: “Nuclear weapons don’t kill people; intense heat and
radiation kill people.”
Jonathan Farley of Stanford
University’s Center for
International Security and Cooperation sees it differently. “Why does New Zealand even need the bomb,
doesn’t it have Orcs?” he asks. “It should send an Orc
army into Australia.”
Professor Jonathan David Farley is a
mathematician at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica. Seed Magazine has named him one of “15 people
who have shaped the global conversation about science in 2005” (lattice@Stanford.edu).